Academic Books

Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis, Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1976; 236 pp + XIV.

Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Sciences, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981; 227 pp. +VI.

Hume and the Problem of Causation, New York, Oxford University Press, (with Tom L. Beauchamp), 1981; 340 pp. +XXV.

The Structure of Biological Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, forth printing 1994; 281 pp. +XI.

 Philosophy of Social Science, Boulder, Westview, 1988; 218 pp + XIV, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, new editions, 1995, 2008, 2011, 2015

Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns, University of Chicago Press, 1992; 266 pp +XVII.

Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, 193 pp. +X.           

The Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge, 2000, new editions 2005, 2012

  • Chinese translation, 2004, Ewen
  • Portuguese translation, 2007, Edicoes Loyola
  • Japanese translation, 2009, Shunjusha
  • Turkish translation, 2015, Dipnot Publishing

Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 248 pp. +VIII

Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Approach, London, Routledge, 2007 (with Daniel McShea).

Non-fiction Trade Book

The Atheist’s Guide to Reality, New York, W.W. Norton, 2011 (paperback edition, 2012)



Formal Thought and the Science of Man, by Gilles-Gaston Granger, translated with Carolyn Fawcett and R.S. Cohen, with an introduction by A.R. Dordrecht, Reidel, 1983; 210 pp + X.


Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Science, with Yuri Balashov, London Routledge,, 2002, pp. 522..

The Philosophy of Biology. With Robert Arp, Blackwell’s 2009


The Girl from Krakow, Lake Union, 2015

Autumn in Oxford, Lake Union, 2016

Journal Articles

Titles in bold are linked to pdfs available on line

“Friedman’s ‘Methodology’ for Economics: a Critical Examination,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences,  2, 1972: 15-29.

“Getting the War News Straight: The Actual Situation in the Philosophy of Science, American Political Science Review,  66, 1972: 818-826 (with David Braybrooke).

“Anti-behaviourism in the Hour of its Disintegration,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences,  2, (1972) 355-363 (with David Braybrooke).

“The nomological character of microeconomics,” Theory and Decision, 6, 1975: 1-26.

“Causation and Recipes:  the Mixture as Before,” Philosophical Studies,  24, 1973: 378-385.

“On Fodor’s Distinction Between Strong and Weak Equivalence in Machine Simulation,” Philosophy of Science,  40, 1973: 118-120.

“Mill and Some Contemporary Critics on ‘Cause’,”  Personalist,  54, 1973: 123-129.

“Action, Purpose and Consciousness Among the Computers,” Philosophy of Science,  40, 1973: 547-557 (with R. Campbell).

“Singular Causal Statements: a Reconsideration,” Philosophical Forum,  5, 1974: 611-618 (with T.L. Beauchamp).

On Kim’s Account of Events and Event Identity,” Journal of Philosophy,  71, 1974: 327-336.

“Proper Hoc, Ergo Post Hoc,” American Philosophical Quarterly, . 12, 1975: 245-254.

“Strong, Weak, and Functional Equivalence in Machine Simulation,” Philosophy of Science,  41, 1974: 412-414 (with N.J. MacIntosh).

“The Virtues of Vagueness in the Language of Science,” Dialogue,  14, 1975: 281-305.

“Terms of Experience and Theory: a Rejoinder to Korner,” Dialogue, 14, 1975: 309-311.

Materialism and Evolution: a Reconsideration,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6, 1976: 127-138.

“The Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 6, 1976: 35-53.

“Rejoinder to Puccetti,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 6, 1976: 143-144 (with R.M. Martin).

“Concrete Occurrences vs. Explanatory Facts:  Mackie on the Extensionality of Causal Statements,” Philosophical Studies, 28, 1977: 133-140.

“Critical Notice of The Cement of the Universe,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 1977: 371-404 (with T.L. Beauchamp).

“Hollis and Nell:  Rationalist Economic Men,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 8, 1978: 87-99.

“The Extensionality of Causal Contexts,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4, 1979: 401-408 (with R.M. Martin).

“The Supervenience of Biological Concepts,” Philosophy of Science, 45, 1978: 368-386.

“Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 9, 1979: 509-529.

“Critical Notice of Method and Appraisal in Economics,” Nous, 15, 1981: 225-230.

“Obstacles to the Nomological Connection of Reasons and Actions,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 10, 1980: 79-91.

“Causation and Counterfactuals: Lewis’ Treatment Reconsidered,” Dialogue, 18, 1979: 210-219.

“The Puzzle of Economic Modeling,” Journal of Philosophy, 75, 1978: 679-683.

“Genetics and the Theory of Natural Selection: Synthesis or Sustenance?” Nature and System, 1, 1978: 3-15. 

“A Skeptical History of Microeconomic Theory,” Theory and Decision, 12, 1980: 79-93.

“Ruse’s Treatment of the Evidence for Evolution: A Reconsideration,” in Giere and Asquith, (eds.) PSA, 1980, East Lansing, Philosophy of Science Association, 1980: 83-93.

“Species Notions and the Theoretical Hierarchy of Biology,” Nature and System, 2, 1980: 163-172.

“Typologies: Obstacles and Opportunities in Scientific Change,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 1981: 298-299.

‘In Hume’s Cause: A Reply to Mackie and Flew,” Philosophical Books, 23, 1982: 140-146. 

“Are there culturgens,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 1982: 22-24.

“On the Propensity Definition of Fitness,” Philosophy of Science, 49, 1982: 605-615 (with C.L. Harden).

“InDefense of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science, 49,  1982: 604-615 (with C.L. Hardin).

 “Critical Notice of Genes, Mind and Culture, Journal of Philosophy, 80, 1983: 304-311. .

“The Human Sciences: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Syracuse Scholar, 4, 1983: 63-80.

“If Economics Isn’t Science, What Is It?” Philosophical Forum, 14, 1983: 296-314.

“Protagoras Among the Physicists,” Dialogue, 22, 1983: 311-317.

“Coefficients, Effects and Genic Selection,” Philosophy of Science, 50, 1983: 332-338.

“Consciousness and Content vs. the Intentional Stance,” Behavioral and Brain Science, 6, 1983: 375-376.

“Fitness,” Journal of Philosophy, 80,1983: 457-474.

“Mackie and Shoemaker on Dispositions and Properties,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7, 1984: 77-91. 

“Fitness, Reinforcement and Underlying Mechanisms,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 1984: 495-496.

“The Place of Psychology in a Vacuum of Theories,” in Annals of Theoretical Psychology, 3, 1985: 95-102.

“Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes from Economics and Ethics, “Social Philosophy and Public Policy, 2, 1985: 48-68.

“Methodology, Theory and the Philosophy of Science,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66, 1985: 377-393.

‘Fitness in Fact and Fiction,” Journal of Philosophy, 82, 1985: 738-749 (with Mary B. Williams).

“Fitness as Primitive and Propensity,” Philosophy of Science, 53, 1986: 412-418 (with Mary B. Williams).

“What Rosenberg’s Philosophy of Economics Is Not,” Philosophy of Science, 53, 1986: 127-132.

On the Explanatory Role of Existence Proofs,” Ethics, 97, 1986: 177-186.

“Lakatosian Consolations for Economists,” Economics and Philosophy, 2, 1986: 127-139.

“Causation and Explanation in Evolutionary Biology, Behaviorism, 14, 1986: 77-88.

“Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology, Part I: The Uneasy Analogy,” Behaviorism, 14, 1986: 15-28.

“Intentional Psychology and Evolutionary Biology: Part II: Crucial Disanalogy,” Behaviorism, 14, 1986: 125-138.

“Ignorance and Disinformation in the Philosophy of Biology: A Reply to Stent,” Biology and Philosophy, 1, 1986: 461-471.

“Weintraub’s Aims: A Brief Rejoinder,” Economics and Philosophy, 3, 1987: 143-144. .

“The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some Considerations,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 5, 1987: 1-31.

“Is There Really ‘Juggling,’ ‘Artiface,’ or ‘Trickery,’ in Genes, Mind and Culture?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10, 1987: 80-82.

“Why Does the Nature of Species Matter,” Biology and Philosophy, 2, 1987: 192-197.

“Economics Is Too Important to be Left to the Rhetoricians,” Economics and Philosophy, 4, 1988: 129-149.

“Rhetoric is Not Important Enough for Economists to Bother About,” Economics and Philosophy, 4, 1988: 173-175.

“Is the Theory of Natural Selection Really a Statistical Theory?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary V, 14, 1988: 187-206.

“Russell vs. Steiner on Physics and Causality,” Philosophy of Science, 56, 1989: 341-347.

“Grievous Faults in Vaulting Ambition?” Ethics, 98, 1988: 827-838.

“Are Generic Predictions Enough,” Erkenntniss, 30, 1989: 43-68.

“Will the Real Argument for Abstracta Please Stand Up?” Behavioral and Brain Science, 11, 1988: 526-527.

“The Past Recaptured: Mongin on the Problem of Realism in Economics,” Philosophy of Social Science, 18, 1988: 379-381.

“Perceptual Presentations and Biological Functions: A Comment on Matthen,” Journal of Philosophy, 86, 1989: 38-44.

“Is Lewis’s Genuine Modal Realism Magical Too?” Mind, 98, 1989: 412-421.

“Superseding Explanation vs. Understanding: The View from Rorty,” Social Research, 56, 1989: 479-510.

“Intensionality, intenSionality and Representation,” Behaviorism, 17, 1989: 137-140.

“Normative Naturalism and the Role of Philosophy,” Philosophy of Science, 57, 1990: 34-43.

“Moral Realism and Social Science,” Midwest Studies, 15, 1990: 150-166.

“The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario,” Social Policy and Philosophy, 8, 1991: 86-101.

“Adequacy Criteria for a Theory of Fitness,” Biology and Philosophy, 6, 1991: 38-41.

“Selection and Science: Critical Notice of David Hull’s Science as a Process,” Biology and Philosophy, 7, 1992: 217-228.

”Causation, Probability and the Monarchy,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 29, 1992: 305-318.

“Contractarianism and the Trolley,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 23, 1992: 88-104.

“Scientific Innovation and the Limits of Social Scientific Prediction,” Synthese, 97, 1993: 1-21.

“Powers and Limits of Agricultural Economics,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75, 1993: 15-24.

“Genic Selection and Biological Instrumentalism,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVIII, 1993: 343-362.

“Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination and Systems of the World (with Carl Hoefer), Philosophy of Science, 61 (1994): 592-607.

“Metaphysical Foundations of Microeconomics,” Monist, 78, 1995: 353-367.

“Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just Society,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 1995, p. 54-71.

"Sober's Philosophy of Biology and His Philosophy of Biology", Philosophy of Science, 63 (1996): 452-465

"A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism", British Journal of Philosophy of Science", 47 (1996): 1-29.

"Research Tactics and Economic Strategies: Case of the Human Genome Project", Social Philosophy and Policy, 13 (1996): 1-18

"Laws, Damn Laws and Ceteris Paribus Clauses", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 34 (1996), supplement: 183-204.

"Reductionism Redux: Computing the Embryo", Biology and Philosophy, 12(1997): 445-470.

"Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of the Theory of natural Selection", with B. Horan and L. Graves, Philosophy of Science, 66 (1999): 140-157.

"La teoria economica como filosofia politica”, Teoria, 13 (1998): 279-299

“Les Limits de la Connaissance Biologique”, Annales d’histoire et de philosophie du vivant, 2(1999): 15-35

“Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1999): 1-24.

 “Economics as Political Philosophy”, Journal of Social Science, 36(1999): 575-587.

“The Problem of Enforcement: Is there an Alternative to Leviathan?” , Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7(2000): 236-239.

“Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right”,  Social Philosophy and Policy, 16 (2000), pp. 68-91.

 “Reductionism in a historical science”, Philosophy of Science, 68 (2001): 135-164.

"La Genetique et le holism debride”, with Andrew Clark,  Review Internationale de Philosophie, 4 (2000), pp. 35-61.

“On multiple realization and special sciences”, Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2001): 365-373

Indeterminacy, probability and randomness in evolutionary theory”, Philosophy of Science, 64 (2001): 536-544.

“How is Biological Explanation Possible”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52 (2001): 735-760

“The priority of intellectual property,” Fraser Forum, February 2003, pp. 12-15.

“Darwin’s Nihilistic Idea”, Biology and Philosophy (with Tamler Sommers), 18 (2003): 653 - 668

“The Political Philosophy of Intellectual Property, with Applications in Biotechnology”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics,  3 (2004): 77-95.

“Fitness, probability and the principles of natural selection”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2004, 55:693-712, with Frederic Bouchard

How to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism about biology”, Philosophy of Science, 68 (2005), with David Kaplan

“On Matthen and Ariew’s Obituary for Fitness: Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated”, Biology and Philosophy, 20 (2005), with Frederic Bouchard.

“Lessons from biology for the philosophy of social science”, Philosophy of SocialScience 35 (2005): 3-19.

"The Rational-Behavioral Debate in Financial Economics",  Journal of Economic Methodology, Forthcoming(with Alon Brav, J. B. Heaton), Journal of Economic 11, 2004, 393-410

“On the original contract: evolutionary game theory and human evolution”, Analyze und Kritik, 27 (2005): 137-157, (with Stefan Linquist).

“The return of the Tabula Raza,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (with Stefan Linquist), 2007.

“How reductionism refutes genetic determinism”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2005

“Defending information free genocentrism”, History and Philosophy of Life Sciences, 27(2006), 345-349.

"Are homologies function free?." Philosophy of Science , with Karen Neander, Philosophy of Science , Vol. 76, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 307-334

“Why do Spatiotemporally Restricted Regularities Explain in the Social Sciences?”British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 20 (2012) 63 (1): 1-26.

Can there be a priori causal models of natural selection?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89 (2011): 591-599.

‘Solving the Circularity Problem for Functions, (with Karen Neander) Journal of Philosophy, 2010, v. 109 (10): 613-622.

“How Jerry Article title: How Jerry Fodor Slid Down the Slippery Slope to Anti-Darwinism, and How We Can Avoid the Same Fate,” European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 3 (1):1-17 (2013)

“Toward reconstruction in moral philosophy,” (with Matthew Braddock), Analyze und Kritik, June 2012, Vol. 34 Issue 1, 63-80

“Reflexivity, Uncertainty and the Unity of Science,” Journal of Economic Methodology, 20: 429-438. [full text:

“What’s wrong with Paul Krugman’s Philosophy of Economics and how to fix it.” [abbreviated version]

“Paul Krugman’s philosophy of economics and what it should be.” in  [full version]

“From rationality to reflexivity,” Economic Thought, v. 3, no. 1, pp. 21-41.

“Cur ate ipsum”, 3AM,



Contributions to Books

"Vincula Revindicata," in T.L. Beauchamp, (ed.)  Philosophical Problems of Causation, Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1974: 217-222 (with David Braybrooke).

"Partial Interpretation and Microeconomics," W. Leinfellner and W. Kohler, (eds.)  Developments in the Methodology of Social Science, Theory and Decision Library, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1974: 93-109.

"Towards the Assimilation of Rules to Generalizations," in W. Shea, (ed.) Basic Issues in Philosophy of Science, New York, Science History Publications, 1976, 156-172.

“The Interaction of Evolutionary and Genetic Theory” in Summer, Slater and Wilson, (ed.) Pragmatism and Purpose, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1981, 207-219.

“Causation and Teleology in Contemporary Philosophy of Science,” Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey,  The Hague, Nijhoff, 2, 1982: 51-86.

 Reprint:“A Skeptical History of Microeconomic Theory,” in J. Pitt, (ed.) Philosophy in Economics, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1981: 47-62

“Human Science and Biological Science,” in N. Rescher, (ed.) Scientific Explanation and Understanding, Lanham, Md., University Presses of America, 1983, 37-52.

Reprint: “The Supervenience of Biological Concepts,” in E. Sober, (ed.) Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Cambridge, Mass, Bradford Books-MIT Press, 1984: 99-116.

Reprint:“The Interanimation of Micro and Macroeconomics,” in D. Hausman, (ed.) The Philosophy of Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (First edition), 1984: 324-343.

“Public Sector Monopolies,” in Holzer and Nagel, (eds.) Productivity and Public Policy, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications, 1984: 219-233.

“Maximization, Markets, and the Measurement of Productivity in the Public Sector,” Bozeman and Straussman, (eds.)  New Directions in Public Administration, 1984: 280-287, Monterey, CA, Brooks/Cole (with J.D. Straussman).

“Darwinism Today--Tomorrow, But Not Yesterday,” in Kitcher, P. and Asquith, P., PSA 1984, East Lansing, Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 1985: 157-173.

“Philosophy of Science and the Potential for Knowledge in Social Sciences,” in Fiske, D. and Schweder, R., Pluralisms and Subjectivities in Social Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985: 339-3

“Adaptionalist Imperatives and Panglossian Paradigms,” in J.M. Fetzer (ed.) Sociobiology and Epistemology, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1985, 161-179.

“Davidson’s Unintended Attack on Psychology,” in E. LePore (ed.) Actions and Events, Oxford, Blackwell’s, 1985: 399-407.

Reprint: “Prospects for the Elimination of Tastes in Economics and Ethics,” in E.F. Paul, J. Paul, and F.D. Miller, (eds.) Ethics and Economics, Oxford, Blackwells, 1985: 48-69.

Reprint: “The Political Philosophy of Biological Endowments: Some Considerations,” in Paul, Miller, Ahrens (eds.) Equal Opportunity, Oxford, Blackwells, 1987: 1-31.

Reprint: “Autonomy and Provincialism,” in Greetvan Geinert (ed.) Holisme en Reductionisme en de Empirishe Wetenschappen, Groningen, Studium Generale, 1987: 10-21.

Reprint of chapter 2 of Structure of Biological Sciences. “From Reductionism to Instrumentalism,” What Philosophy of Biology is, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989: 245-262.

Reprint:“Are Generic Predictions Enough” in B. Hamminga, (ed.) Philosophy and Economics II, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989: 43-68.

Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?” in M. Bekoff, Jameson (eds.) Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Annual Behavior, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, 180-196.

Reprint: “Fitness, Reinforcement and Underlying Mechanisms,” in C. Catania & S. Harnad (eds.) The Selection of Behavior, Cambridge U.P., 1990, 57-59.

“A quoi bon la theorie de l’equilibre general?” La Methodologie de L'economie Theorique et Applique Aujourd’hui,” J. Wolff, et al., (ed.) Paris Nathan, 1990, 170-187.

Reprint: “The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario,” in Paul, Miller, Rowe, (ed.) Ethics, Politics and Human Nature, Oxford, Blackwell’s, 1991, 86-101.

Reprint: “The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario,” in P. Thompson, (ed.) Ethics and Biology, SUNY Press, 1995.

"How is Eliminative Materialism Possible?” in Radu Bogdan, Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

"What’s So Special About General Equilibrium?” Economics, Culture, Education, London, Elgar, 1991, 10-133.

“Common Knowledge, Equilibrium and Other Idealizations: Commentary Bicchieri,” in N. DeMarchi (ed.) Postpopperian Methodology of Economics, Boston, Dordrecht, 1992, 189-194.

“Altruism: Theoretical Context,” Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, (eds.) E. Fox-Keller and L. Lloyd, Harvard University Press, 1992, 20-28.

“Teleology,” in Burkhardt, et al., Handbook of Metaphysics, Munich, Philosophia Verlag, 1991, 391-393.

“Evolutionary Biology and Neoclassical Economics: Strange Bedfellows,” PSA, vol. 1, East Lansing, Philosophy of Science Association, 1992, 174-183.

Reprint: “If Economics Isn’t a Science, What Is It?” in Caldwell, B., (ed.) The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics, vol. III, Aldershot, UK, Elgar, 1993, 426-442.

“Hume and the Philosophy of Science,” in Norton, (ed.) Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 64-89.

“Hausman, Inexact and Separate Science of Economics,” Critical Notice, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, 1993, 533-537.

“The Cognitive Status of Economic theory,” in Backhouse, Nature of Economic Method, London, Routledge, 1994: 216-235.

“Does Evolutionary Theory Give Aid or Comfort to Economics,” in P. Mirowski, ed. Natural Images in Economic Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1994), 384-407.

Reprint: "If economics isn't a science, what is it?", in M. Martin and L. McIntyre, Readings in the philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994, pp. 661-674.

“Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome Project,” PSA, 1994, volume 2.  East Lansing, MI. Philosophy of Science Association, 329-338.

Reprint: "Is There an Evolutionary Biology of Play?, in Bekoff, M., and Jameson, D., Readings in Animal Cognition, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 217-228.

“Folk Psychology” in J. B. Davis, ed., Handbook of Economic Methodology, Aldershot, Elgar, 1998.

"Philosophy of Economics" in Audi, R., Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 582-583..

Reprint: "The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic Strategies", in Paul, E., Miller, F, and Paul, J., eds., Scientific Innovation, Philosophy and Public Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 1-26.

Reprint: "The Human Genome Project: Research Tactics and Economic Strategies", in Hull and Ruse, eds., Philosophy of Biology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998

Reprint: “Altruism: theoretical Considerations”, in Hull and Ruse, eds., Philosophy of Biology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998

"Philosophy of Biology" in D. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supplementary volume, New York, Simon-Schuster McMillan, 1996, pp. 407-411.

“Problems of the Philosophy of Social Science,” in E. Craig , (ed.) Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwells, 1998.

“Sociobiology,” in E. Craig, (ed.) Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwells, 1998.

“Philosophy of Social Science,” in W. Newton-Smith, (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, London, Blackwell, 2000, 451-460.

 “Laws, History and the Nature of Scientific Understanding”, Evolutionary Biology, volume 32, Hecht, MacIntyre, and Clegg, (eds.), Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2000, pp. 51-71.

"Limits to Biology", in Carrier, M., Ruetsche, L. and Massey, G., Science at Century’s End, University of Pittsburgh Press., 2000, pp. 247-265.

 Reprint: “Privacy as a Matter of Taste and Right”, in Paul, Miller and Paul, (eds), The Right to Privacy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 68-91.

“The Character Concept in Taxonomy, Evolution, and Development” in G. Wagner, ed.,The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 199-214

“The problem of enforcement: Is there an alternative to Leviathan”, in Leonard Katz (ed), Evolutionary Origins of Morality,  Thorverton, UK, Imprint Academic, 2000, pp. 236-239

Philosophy of molecular biology”, Encyclopedia of Life Sciences, London, McMillan, 2001.

“Fitness”, in Zalta, (ed),  Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (with Frederic Bouchard).

“Reductionism in a historical science”, in David Hull, and Marc Van Regenmortel, eds.,Promises and Limits of Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences, John Wiley,  2002, pp.125-155.

“Darwinism in Moral and Political Theory”, in Hodge andRaddick, eds., Cambridge Companion to Darwin, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

“Problems of the Philosophy of Biology”, with Robert Brandon,  Philosophy of Science Today, eds. Peter Clark, and Katherine Hawley, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003

“Drift, fitness, and the foundations of probability”, with Frederic Bouchard, in Andreas Hutterman (ed), Indeterminism in Physics and Biology, Paderborn, Mentis., 2003.

“Will genomics do more for metaphysics than Locke,” in Peter Achinstein (ed), Scientific Evidence, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, pp. 186-206.

“Good Ideas and Human Welfare: Big Pharma versus the Developing Nations”,, in D. Ross, ed. Developmental Dilemmas, ed. M. Ayogu, and D. Ross, London,  Routledge, 2005,      

“Genomics and cultural evolution,’ in Giovanni Boniolo and Gabriele de Anna (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics andContemporary Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2005  

“Reductionism in molecular biology” Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, D. Hull, M. Ruse, eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press.

“Reductionism in biology”, Philosophy of Biology, edited by M., Matthen, C. Stephens, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 349-368

“Reductionism”, Blackwell Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, A. Plutinsky, S. Sarkar, Oxford, Blackwells

“Thomas Kuhn”, International Encyclopedia of Social Science, New York, McMillan

"If economics is a science, what kind of a science is it?", in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics, edited by Harold Kincaid, Don Ross, pp. Oxford University Press, 2009,  pp. 55-67.  

“Biology,” The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by S. Psillos, and M. Curd, Routledge, 2008, pp. 511-520, second edition, 2013

“Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics,” in Bickel (ed), Oxford Handbook for Philosophy and Neuroscience, Oxford University Press, 2009, 143-165.

“Designing A Successor To The Patent As Second Best Solution To The Problem Of Optimum Provision Of Good Ideas,” New Frontiers In The Philosophy Of intellectual Property , Edited By Annabelle Lever, Cambridge University Press, 2012 , 88-109

“Biology,” The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Second Edition, edited by S. Psillos, and M. Curd, Routledge, 2012, pp. 511-520

“Why I am a Naturalist,” in Matthew Hoag, ed. Philosophical Methods, London, Taylor and Francis, 2013, pp. 32-35

“Can naturalism save the humanities,” in Matthew Hoag, ed. Philosophical Methods, London, Taylor and Francis, 2013, pp. 39-42

“The debate”, in Is Faith in God Reasonable? Ed. Miller and Gould, New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 26-24

“Replies to Critics,” in Is Faith Reasonable? Ed. Miller and Gould, New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 166-170.

“The biological character of social theory,” in Jon Turner, et. al., Handbook of Evolution and Society,” Boulder, Co., Paradigm Publishers, pp. 1-48.

Revised entry: “Fitness”, in Zalta, (ed),  Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (with Frederic Bouchard).